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Eric T. Olson
In S. Blatti and P. Snowdon, eds., Essays on Animalism, OUP 2016
Animalism, the view that we are animals, appears to have the troubling implication
that removing your brain from your head would create a 惇remnant person敦, who
would be destroyed when put into a new head.  The problem is serious and has no
really satisfying solution.  But it has nothing to do with animalism as such, and
afflicts animalism瀞s main rival in equal measure.
animalism, brain transplant, Mark Johnston, personal identity, remnant person
Animalism is the view that you and I and other normal human people are
animals--biological organisms.1  It is that we are animals not merely in some loose
sense--that we have animal bodies, say--but in the simplest and most
straightforward sense.  There is a certain human animal, and that animal is you.
The most common objection to this view is that it conflicts with widespread and
deeply held beliefs about what would happen to us in certain imaginary cases.
Suppose your brain were put into my head, and my own brain destroyed.  It seems
that the resulting being would remember your life and not mine.  He would have
your beliefs, preferences, plans, and other mental properties, for the most part at
least.  In other words, he would be psychologically continuous with me.  Who would
he be:  me with a new brain, or you with a new body?  (Or someone else
altogether?)
Animalism implies that he would be me.  That瀞s because the operation does not
move an animal from one head to another, but simply moves an organ from one
animal to another, just as a liver transplant does.  (I return to this claim in §5.)  One
animal loses its brain and remains behind as an empty-headed vegetable; another
has its brain destroyed and replaced with yours.  And according to animalism you
are the donor animal and I am the recipient:  you get an empty head and I get your
brain.
This means that the operation would destroy my knowledge, life plans,
1By 酉animals瀞 I mean those organisms that are not plants, fungi, bacteria, or
protoctists.  Note that Johnston uses the word 酉animal瀞 to mean something that is
not an organism, but rather a thing 惇constituted by敦 an organism distinct from it
(2007: 55).
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preferences, and character traits, and give me yours instead.  It would erase all my
memories of my own past and replace them with memories of yours:  of journeys I
never took, conversations I never had, people I never met.  It would fill my head with
false beliefs, making me convinced that I lived in your house, worked at your job,
and was the child of your mother.  I should become systematically mistaken about
who I am and my place in the world.  As for you:  even if the operation didn瀞t kill you
outright, it would deprive you of your knowledge, memories, plans, and
preferences--nearly all that matters.
In my experience, those presented with the transplant story have an almost
irresistible urge to reject this description.  It just sounds wrong to say that putting
your brain into my head would give me a new brain full of false memories.  Surely
the one who got your brain would be you.  A liver transplant moves an organ from
one person to another, but a brain transplant is not really an organ transplant at all,
but a 惇full-body  transplant敦.  It moves a person from one organism to another.  (As
for me:  when the surgeons remove my brain before destroying it, they remove me
from my own head, just as they remove you from yours.)
But this attractive alternative description is incompatible with animalism.  It
implies that you and the animal--the one you would be if you were any animal at
all--could go your separate ways.  And a thing and itself can never go their
separate ways.  So the alternative description implies that you are one thing and
the animal is another.  Even if you never have a brain transplant, you have the
property that no animal has, namely being such that you would move to another
animal if your brain did.2  But a thing cannot both be an animal and have a property
that no animal has.  Call this the transplant objection to animalism.
Some readers may be assuming that the operation would have to move some
conscious, intelligent being from one animal to another.3  That being would start
out with the ability to move your limbs and see through your eyes, then become
able to move my limbs and see through my eyes (or the limbs and eyes that were
once mine) instead.  Animalism, the idea goes, simply denies that this conscious
being would be you, insisting instead that you would be the brainless organism left
behind.  That looks unattractive.  If some conscious being really did move from your
head to mine, and was psychologically continuous with you afterwards, there is
good reason to suppose that it would be you.
But no animalist would accept that there is any such being.  Why suppose that
moving your brain to my head would move a conscious nonanimal--a thinking
being in addition to the animal?  That is a substantive metaphysical claim, and it
gets no support from reflecting on who would be who in imaginary cases.  If the
3This assumption is implicit in Shoemaker 1984: 108-111, for example.
2If there are no such modal properties as this (as counterpart theorists say), or if we
don瀞t have them, the argument fails and the objection evaporates.
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transplant objection relied on that claim, it would have to begin with some
reasoning for it; yet those who make the objection see no need for such reasoning.
That the operation moves a conscious being from one head to another is a
consequence of the transplant objection, but not one of its starting points.
It can be hard to believe that a brain transplant is metaphysically analogous to a
liver transplant.  That might make it hard to believe that we are animals.
But this hardly settles the matter.  The transplant objection gets its force from the
general principle that anyone who is psychologically continuous with you (in the
way that the recipient of your brain in the transplant story is) must be you.  Yet most
opponents of animalism concede that this principle is false.4  If each half of your
brain were transplanted into a different head, both resulting beings would be
psychologically continuous with you.  Each would be convinced that she was you. 
Yet they could not both be you:  there is only one of you, and one thing cannot be
numerically identical to two things.  At least one of them would be systematically
mistaken about who she is and her place the world.  So the critics of animalism face
a transplant objection of their own.  If animalism has unwelcome consequences in
惇single敦 brain-transplant scenarios, its critics must accept similar unwelcome
consequences in 惇double敦 transplants.  And whatever those critics can say by way
of defending their view against the double-transplant objection can be used to
defend animalism against the original transplant objection.
Further, if the transplant objection makes it hard to believe that we are animals,
other considerations make it at least as hard to believe that we are not animals
(Olson 2003).  There is a human animal sitting where you are.  It has your brain,
and shares your history (for the most part, anyway).  It behaves exactly as you do in
both actual and counterfactual situations.  That ought to make it conscious and
intelligent--just as intelligent as you are.  But if you are not an animal, this would
make you one of two conscious and intelligent beings sitting there and reading this.
More generally, there would be two conscious and intelligent beings wherever we
thought there was just one--two people, if being conscious and intelligent in the
way that you are suffices for being a person.  Only one of them would persist by
virtue of psychological continuity, and would go with its transplanted brain.  How
could you ever know which person you are--the animal person or the nonanimal
person?  Any reason you may have to suppose that you are the nonanimal looks
like a reason for the animal to think the same about itself.  That is something no one
would accept.  And if for all you know you may be an animal, then for all you know
you might not be the one who would get your transplanted brain, undermining the
4Friends of the temporal-parts ontology can accept the principle, or something
close to it (Lewis 1976).  They say that in 惇fission敦 cases, your preoperative
temporal parts are shared by two people, who differ in their postoperative temporal
parts.  There are two of you all along, and the surgeons separate them.
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transplant objection.
Opponents of animalism have two possible replies.  One is to deny that any
human animal (or presumably any other organism) is ever conscious and
intelligent, and try to explain why.  This would imply that you are the only conscious,
intelligent being there.  The other is to accept that there are two conscious,
intelligent beings, and try to explain how you can nevertheless know you瀞re the one
that瀞s not an organism.5  Either reply will need to include an account of what sort of
beings we are, if not organisms.  Call this the 惇thinking-animal problem敦.  It makes
the transplant objection look rather insignificant.
Mark Johnston has pointed out that the transplant story raises another problem
for animalism, independent of the transplant objection.6  Think of your brain in mid-
transplant, removed from your head but kept alive.  (It has to be composed of living
tissue, else the transplant will fail.)
Suppose it瀞s possible for the brain, in this condition, to support thought and
consciousness of the sort you had before the operation.  This assumption is widely
taken for granted:  it is the basis for all 惇brain-in-a-vat敦 thought experiments.  In
reality, there is nothing obvious about it.  It certainly doesn瀞t follow from the
assumption that the the brain carries psychological continuity, in that the person
who who had it at the end of the operation would be psychologically continuous
with the donor.  Someone ought to offer an argument for this claim.  But I will
concede it for the sake of argument and see what follows.
If the detached brain supports thought and consciousness, there has to be a
being whose thought and consciousness it is.  (Otherwise we ought to wonder
whether there are any people at all, undermining both animalism and its rivals.)
This being would seem to be your brain itself, or perhaps a spatial or temporal part
of it.  Or it might be something that your brain or a part of it 惇constitutes敦.  (I will
return to constitution later.)  Because this thing (we are supposing) would be
psychologically more or less like you, that should make it a person--a radically
maimed person, we might say.  Johnston calls it a remnant person.  Roughly,
someone is a remnant person at a time just if she is a wholly organic person but not
an organism or a thing constituted by an organism then, and this condition results
from cutting away a portion of a normal human person.
This looks like trouble for animalism.  Animalism seems to imply that the
remnant person would not be you:  you would be the brainless vegetable left
behind.  The problem is not that the remnant person seems to be you.  That would
6Johnston 2007.  I described a version of the problem earlier (Olson 1997: 120f.),
but Johnston develops it much more forcefully.
5Shoemaker (1999, 2011) tries to explain why animals cannot have mental
properties; Noonan (2010) tries to explain how we can know that we瀞re not the
animals thinking our thoughts.
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be just a variant of the original transplant objection.  Nor is the problem that the
remnant person would be a person but not an organism.  That is perfectly
compatible with animalism, which does not say that all people are organisms, but
only that we human people are:  it allows that there may be immaterial gods or
angels.  The trouble comes when we ask where the remnant person, if she were
not you, could have come from.  She could hardly have existed before the
operation.  If she had, and supposing she was a person then, there would have
been two people within your skin at once--you, who according to animalism
became a brainless vegetable, and the remnant person, who became a naked
brain.  We don瀞t want to say that.  The alternative seems to be that the operation
brings the remnant person into being.  But we don瀞t want to say that either.
Why not?  For one thing, it seems that there are only two people in the
transplant story--you and I--even if we disagree about what happens to them.  If the
remnant person were someone new, there would be three:  you, me, and the
remnant person created by removing your brain from your head.  Or rather four:  if
removing your brain creates one new remnant person, then removing my brain to
make room for yours creates another.  There would be you, me, and the two
remnant people created when our brains are removed.  That瀞s two too many.
And it瀞s hard to believe that removing someone瀞s brain from her head would
create a new person.  As Johnston puts it:
You can瀞t bring a person into being simply by removing tissue from something...,
unless that tissue was functioning to suppress mental life or the capacity for
mental life.  A developing fetus might have a massive tumor in its developing
brain, which suppresses its mental life, and perhaps even its capacity for mental
life.  Given that, we can understand how removing the tumor could allow a
person in Locke瀞s sense to be present for the first time.  But how could removing
a sustaining [head and] torso bring this about? (2007: 47)
If animalism really does imply that the transplant operation would bring a remnant
person into being, it violates the attractive principle that you cannot bring a person
into being merely by cutting away harmless tissue:  call it the creation principle.
Now most opponents of animalism will reject this principle as stated (Snowdon
2014: 235f.).  Suppose each of your cerebral hemispheres were transplanted into a
different head.  The result would presumably be two people, each psychologically
continuous with you to an extent that would suffice for her to be you (according to
the transplant objection of §1) were it not for the presence of the other.  But you
could not be both those people, since they are distinct from each other.  So the
operation must have brought at least one of them into being.  It has created a
person by cutting away tissue that did not 惇suppress mental life or the capacity for
mental life.敦  If this is a problem, it瀞s not one that can be solved by rejecting
animalism.
6
But we may be able to revise the creation principle to make it consistent with the
anti-animalist position that Johnston and others want to promote.  Perhaps you
cannot bring a person into being merely by cutting away sustaining tissue.  In the
double transplant you don瀞t create a person merely by removing sustaining tissue;
you also have to cut the hemispheres apart.
In any event, the problem has another side that Johnston doesn瀞t mention.
Imagine once again that your brain is moved from your head to mine and the
utilities connected in such a way as to make the resulting person more or less
normal.  (This is likely to exceed the capabilities of any possible human surgeon,
but never mind.  Archangels could do it.)  If I am an organism, this person is me.
But I am not the former remnant person (the one created, or made a remnant
person, by removing your brain from your head).  I was never a detached brain.
More generally, nothing can be a detached brain at one time and an organism at
another; you can瀞t make a naked brain into an organism by putting it into a new
head.  Before I was given your brain, I was a brainless vegetable.  So according to
animalism the remnant person is not me.  But then what happens to the remnant
person when she goes into my head?  Surely she doesn瀞t continue existing but
cease to be a person.  Nor does she come to be one of two people within my skin.
It looks as if she must cease to exist.  That would make it impossible to carry out a
successful brain transplant without killing someone.  And isn瀞t providing a radically
maimed person with the parts she was missing a funny way of destroying her?
Animalism appears to violate the attractive principle that you cannot destroy a
person merely by supplying her with sustaining tissues:  call it the destruction
principle.
So the new objection to animalism is that it violates the creation and destruction
principles.  You can瀞t create a person just by cutting away sustaining tissues, or
destroy one just by providing them.  Yet animalism (the objection claims) implies
that you can do these things.  (It also implies that there are four people in the
transplant story, whereas there are clearly just two.)
This 惇remnant-person problem敦 is not merely the original transplant objection
put differently.  One version of that objection is that the remnant person who would
result from removing your brain from your head ought to be you, as she would be
psychologically continuous with you.  (She would think she was you.)  This would
rely on the principle that anyone who is psychologically continuous with you must
be you, which, as we saw earlier, is doubtful.  And animalism can explain why the
remnant person would not be you:  you are an animal, and no animal can become
a remnant person.  But Johnston瀞s objection does not require that the remnant
person would have to be you.  His claim is simply that the operation could not have
brought her into being.  And animalism does nothing to explain how the operation
could bring a person into being, or how implanting a remnant person into a new
head could destroy her.
To explain how the transplant operation could create and then destroy
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someone, we should need an account of the metaphysical nature of remnant
people--something that would tell us, among other things, when they come into
being and pass away.  But animalism offers only an account of our own
metaphysical nature:  that of normally embodied human people.  It says nothing
about remnant people, who would not be organisms.
(Matters may be even worse than this.  If a remnant person would not be an
animal, there could be human people who are not animals.  In that case we ought
to wonder why there is no such nonanimal person associated with each normal
human being.  If there were, then either there would be two people associated with
each human being--an animal and a nonanimal person--or else no human person
would be an animal.)
I have no account of why removing someone瀞s brain from her head should bring
a new person into being, or why putting it back would destroy one.  I like these
claims no better than Johnston does.  If animalism implied them, this would be
more than just a surprising and counterintuitive consequence.  (Every important
view has those.)  It would be a metaphysical mystery.7  I think animalists should
deny that any remnant person is created or destroyed in the transplant operation.
What they need to do is explain, in a way consistent with these constraints, what
sort of thing the remnant person would be, where she could come from, what would
happen to her at the end of the operation and why, and how she would relate to
you and me.  I will discuss three sorts of proposals for doing this.  One is that the
remnant person who would result from removing your brain from your head would
be you (§§5-7).  The second is that she would be your brain (§8).  The third is that
there would be no remnant person at all (§9).
How could the remnant person be you, the donor organism?  One thought is
that despite appearances, a human organism really would go with its transplanted
brain:  the operation would not transfer an organ from one animal to another, but
pare an animal down to a naked brain and later supply it with new peripheral parts
to replace the ones cut away.8  The claim is not that a detached brain would be a
sort of stripped-down organism, but that cutting away your vital organs would
temporarily make you a nonorganism.
This is consistent with animalism, which is the thesis that we are organisms, not
8The proposal would somehow have to avoid the impossible implication that a
thing can come to be something that was previously only a part of it--that is, that a
thing and another thing can become a thing and itself (van Inwagen 1981).
7Aristotelian hylomorphists may see no mystery.  On their view, a detached and
functioning brain might be a substance but an undetached brain would not be; and
a substance is a substance essentially.  That would explain why the operation must
create and then destroy the remnant person (Toner 2014: 84).  This view is hard to
understand, and I cannot explore it here.
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that we are organisms essentially.  Whether an organism must be essentially or
permanently an organism is independent of whether you and I are organisms.
Because it implies that no remnant person would be created or destroyed in the
operation, it would solve the remnant-person problem.  For that matter, it would
answer the original transplant objection by implying that you would go with your
transplanted brain.  Both objections would be based on a natural but false
assumption about what it takes for a human animal to persist through time.
Because the proposal implies that human animals are only accidentally animals (in
that they can exist without being animals), I will call it accidentalism.
Although this sort of view is sometimes mentioned (Johnston 2007: 51-54,
Hershenov 2008), I have never met anyone who actually believed it.  It瀞s not hard to
see why.  No organism would go with its transplanted liver:  if you remove an
animal瀞s liver, it simply ceases to be a part of the animal.  And the brain瀞s role in the
persistence of an animal appears little different from that of the liver.  If anything, an
animal looks less likely go with its transplanted brain than to go with its
transplanted liver:  the medics say that a human being can survive longer without a
brain than without a liver (Shewmon 2001).
But the proposal is not merely unprincipled.  Consider that the empty-headed
thing remaining after your brain is removed may still be alive.  That is, it may be a
living organism.  In that case it would apparently have the same life, in Locke瀞s
sense of the word, that the original organism had:  the original organism瀞s life-
sustaining functions would have continued uninterrupted throughout the operation
in the brainless remainder.  And if an organism瀞s biological life carries on, we
should expect it to continue to be the life of that same organism (van Inwagen 1990:
142-158).  How could an organism be outlived by its own biological life?  Yet
accidentalism implies that this brainless animal would not be the original organism.
That would make it pretty mysterious what the persistence of an organism could
consist in.  Our usual judgments about what happens to an organism when parts
are cut away would be seriously unreliable.  Think about how many human animals
there are in the transplant story.  Everyone takes there to be two:  the donor and the
recipient of the transplanted organ.  But according to accidentalism there are four.
One animal--you--starts out full-sized, is then pared down to a brain, and later
acquires my noncerebral parts, thereby regaining its previous size.  The empty-
headed animal left behind when your brain is removed is a second organism.  I am
a third.  Removing my brain to make way for yours reduces me to a naked brain,
leaving behind a fourth animal, which then ceases to be an organism (or perhaps
to exist at all) when your brain goes into its head.
This would also introduce a new trouble just as pressing as the remnant-person
problem.  The empty-headed vegetable left behind when your brain is removed
could be an organism.  Where could it have come from?  If it existed before the
operation, then either it was a second organism sharing your skin, or else removing
your brain made it into an organism.  Neither option has any plausibility.  The
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alternative is that the operation brought it into being.  But can you really create an
organism merely by cutting away what would otherwise have been one of its
organs?  Or suppose the surgeons put your brain back into your head.  According
to accidentalism, you then cease to be a naked brain and become a full-sized
human animal once more.  But what happens to the empty-headed organism into
which your brain is implanted?  The reimplantation could hardly bring it about that
there are two human animals within the same skin.  It looks as if the empty-headed
organism must cease to exist.  But how could you destroy an organism merely by
supplying it with the organ it was missing?  If we have to say all that, we might as
well reject the original creation and destruction principles.
Here is another view on which the remnant person would be you.  Suppose that
removing your brain neither makes the animal into a brainless vegetable nor
reduces it to a naked brain, but rather changes it from a connected object to a
disconnected or 惇scattered敦 one.  The organism comes to be composed of two
detached parts, the brainless vegetable and the naked brain.  It may thereby cease
to be an organism, making this proposal a variant of accidentalism.  The thoughts
realized in the brain would then be the thoughts of that scattered object.  So the
remnant person is not the brain or anything the size of a brain--no such being is
ever a person--but a thing composed of the naked brain and the brainless
vegetable.  If your brain is later transplanted into my head, it then ceases to be a
part of the remnant person (you) and becomes a part of me, another organism, and
the thoughts realized in it become my thoughts.  You then become a brainless
vegetable.9  No remnant person is created or destroyed in the course of the
operation, and there would be only two people in the story, you and I, just as there
appear to be.  Call this 惇scattered animalism敦.
It is another friendless view.  Like accidentalism, it threatens to imply that there
are four human organisms in the transplant story.  Two, you and I, become
scattered when their brains are removed (and may cease thereby to be organisms).
And the two brainless vegetables that this removal leaves behind may also be
organisms.  That, again, is two too many.  Also like accidentalism, it implies that
removing your brain could create a new organism--the brainless vegetable--and
that putting your brain back in your head would destroy that organism, violating
analogues of the creation and destruction principles.
Nor would it solve the remnant-person problem in its full generality.  Suppose
your brain is removed and that this makes you a scattered object composed of a
detached brain and a brainless vegetable.  Now let a new brain be implanted into
your head.  The new brain becomes a part of the object that was previously a
brainless vegetable and is now definitely an organism.  This makes the new brain a
part of you.  (The organism of which it is a part is either you or a part of you, and a
9Again, the proposal would need to avoid the problem raised in note 8.
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part of part of something is itself a part of it.)  But what about your original brain?
Would it still be a part of you?  Would you have two brains at once?  If so, you could
have any number:  the new brain could itself be put into the vat and replaced with a
third, and so on.  No one would want to say that.  The alternative is that your
original brain would cease to be a part of you when a new one is put into your
head.  (Never mind why.)  But in that case your original brain would come to be (or
constitute) a remnant person other than you, raising the original problem once
more.
A third view on which the remnant person would be you is consistent with there
being just two organisms in the transplant story.  When your brain is removed it is
no longer a part of you.  You stay behind with an empty head.  If that organ were
later put into my head, it would become a part of me, just as animalism leads us to
expect.  But the remnant person--the subject of the thoughts realized in the naked
brain--is not that brain itself, but you, the now-brainless organism.  Although the
brain is no longer a part of you, you still use it to think.  The thoughts realized in it
are not its own--brains don瀞t think--but yours.  You think 惇remotely敦, in that your
thought processes go on entirely outside your boundaries.  (Thus, thinking and
consciousness can be extrinsic properties.)  Call this the remote-thought
hypothesis.  It has a real advocate:  Rory Madden (2011) proposes it to defend
animalism against the transplant objection.
What makes the brainless vegetable the thinker of the thoughts going on in what
was once its brain?  Madden瀞s idea is that the reference of thoughts and utterances
is whatever the best Davidsonian interpretation assigns to them--that is, the best
way of assigning them content.  And one of the desiderata of such an interpretation
is to maximize knowledge.  If we took the autobiographical beliefs realized in the
naked brain to refer to the brain itself, we should have to conclude that most of them
are false and so not knowledge, since most of the things you believe about yourself
are not true of your brain.  The remnant person might have beliefs she would
express like this:  I was born in Nether Crozzledene; I attended St Brutus瀞s Primary
School; I am tall enough to reach the light fixture without a ladder.  And although
these things may be true of you, they cannot be true of your brain:  a brain cannot
be born or go to school or be tall enough to reach light fixtures.  So if we are to
interpret these beliefs in a way that would make them true, we must take them to
refer to you and not to the detached brain.
Some of the autobiographical beliefs you acquire while your brain is detached
may be true if they refer to the brain and not if they refer you, the organism.
Suppose your brain is kept for some time in one of those nutrient vats that
philosophers like to imagine, and that its keepers enable the remnant person to
惇see敦 by attaching the brain to a camera mounted on the edge of the vat.  This may
give that person a belief she would express by saying, 惇I am in a room with a vat in
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it.敦  If this belief referred to you, the brainless vegetable lying in another room
without a vat, it would be false, whereas if it referred to the brain it would be true.
Still, far more of the remnant person瀞s autobiographical beliefs will count as
knowledge if they refer to the organism than if they refer to the brain.
Now if there were a thinking being that shared its matter with the organism until
its brain is removed and with the brain thereafter, we might be able to give an even
better interpretation by assigning it as the reference of the remnant person瀞s
autobiographical beliefs.  On that interpretation, such beliefs acquired both before
and after your brain is removed may come out true.  But as we saw in §2, the
transplant story provides no reason to suppose that there is any such being, and no
animalist would accept it.
Suppose, then, that the remnant person瀞s autobiographical thoughts would refer
to you, the brainless animal.  Madden infers from this that they would be your
thoughts.  In that case you, the animal, would be the remnant person, solving the
problem.
The remote-thought hypothesis raises many questions.10  But even if it瀞s true, it
cannot solve the remnant-person problem.  As Madden concedes, his proposal
implies that if your brain is kept alive in the vat for long enough, and comes to
support enough new autobiographical beliefs true of it but not of you (the
organism), their reference will eventually shift from you to the brain.  At that point
the brain will become the thinker of those thoughts and a remnant person distinct
from you, reinstating the original problem.
Our question is what animalists can say about the remnant person who would
result from removing your brain from your head.  So far I have considered views on
which the remnant person would be you.  Another thought is that she would be your
brain--that is, the thing that is now in fact your brain.  (Not something constituted by
your brain, but the brain itself.)  In that case again the operation would not bring a
person into being or destroy one, making animalism compatible with the creation
and destruction principles.  Call this remnant cerebralism.
Of course, your brain is not a person now (not according to animalism, anyway).
Otherwise there would be two people sitting there and reading this, you (the
organism) and your brain.  More generally, there would be two people wherever we
10One such question is why first-person thoughts must always refer to the being
whose thoughts they are--the one thinking them.  Most temporal-parts theorists say
that when your current stage thinks, 惇I fell off the roof,敦 it refers not to itself--the stage
didn瀞t even exist when the fall took place--but to the temporally extended person of
which it is a part.  (I discuss this sort of view in Olson 2007: 37-39, 119-122.)  If first-
person thoughts need not refer to their thinkers, then the remnant person could be
the brain, as she appears to be, even if Madden is right to say that the first-person
thoughts she has while in the vat would refer to the brainless organism.
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thought there was just one.  Transplanting your brain would transfer the 惇brain
person敦 to a new organism and leave the 惇animal person敦 behind with an empty
head (even if she would no longer count as a person in that condition), leaving you
to wonder whether you yourself are the brain person, who would go with the
transplanted brain, or the animal person, who would not, and how you could ever
know.  To avoid these troubles, the proposal has to be that removing your brain
from your head would change it from a nonperson into a person.  And because
there would not be two people within my skin after the transplant, putting it into my
head would make it a nonperson once more.
So remnant cerebralism replaces the claim that cutting away sustaining tissues
can bring a person into existence with the claim that it can make a nonperson into a
person.  And restoring those tissues would not destroy a person, but merely make
her a nonperson.  But that瀞s hardly any easier to believe.  What瀞s more, the
proposal implies that there are four people in the transplant story--you, me, and our
two detached brains--yet there appear to be just two.
It also raises an urgent question:  why is your brain not a person now?  The
most natural answer is that it hasn瀞t got the right mental properties:  to be a person,
as Locke said, is to be intelligent and self-conscious, and your brain is not now
intelligent and self-conscious.  Presumably it has no mental properties at all.  But
why not?  It appears to have all the physical infrastructure needed for mentality:  it is
connected to its environment via sense organs and motor nerves; and it has the
right sort of history to be a thinker, if that matters.  It would think, according to
cerebralism, if it were removed from your head and suitably cosseted.  It seems to
follow that what prevents your brain from thinking now is nothing more than its
fleshy surroundings.  An embodied brain is no more sentient or intelligent than a
liver, but remove it from its natural habitat and it will blossom instantly into a
sophisticated rational being.  And putting it back where it belongs would restore it to
its former state of oblivion.  This would mean that the tissues surrounding the brain
really do (as Johnston would say) 惇suppress mental life or the capacity for mental
life.敦  They don瀞t suppress it altogether:  they don瀞t prevent the organism from
thinking.  But they prevent the brain from thinking (Hawley 1998).  Yet surely you
cannot give something the capacity for thought and consciousness merely by
cutting away sustaining tissues, or deprive it of that capacity just by providing them.
That looks as compelling as the original creation and destruction principles.
Or maybe your brain does now think, and shares all your mental properties.  It
thinks not merely in some attenuated or derivative sense, by being the organ
responsible for your thinking, but strictly speaking.  Yet it might not be a person now
because it is a proper part of you:  personhood is 惇maximal敦, in that no person can
be a proper part of another person.11  Removing your brain from your head would
11Burke 2003.  The idea that personhood is a maximal property is familiar from the
ontology of temporal parts, according to which you think at a moment only insofar
as the momentary temporal part or 惇stage敦 of you located then thinks strictly
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overcome this obstacle and thus transform it into a person.  Though this would still
imply that there are four people in the transplant story (the two organisms and the
two detached brains), it would at least explain why there are four.
This new proposal is that before the operation, you, the organism, are a person,
despite thinking only in the derivative sense of having a thinking brain as a part.
Your brain is not a person, even though it thinks nonderivatively.  (Why you would
be a person and your thinking brain would not be, rather than vice versa, is an
obvious question left unanswered.)  Removing your brain makes you into a
nonperson by depriving you of your thinking part, and makes your brain into a
person by bringing it about that it is no longer a part of a person.  So the operation
does not create a person, or enable a previously unthinking being to think; nor
would putting your brain into my head destroy a person or render one unable to
think.  This would explain where the remnant person comes from in a way
consistent with the creation and destruction principles.
It would follow that no actual person has, strictly and nonderivatively, the mental
properties characteristic of personhood (there being in fact no remnant people).
And none of the beings that really have got those properties--normal embodied
brains--are people.  This is at odds with what most of us take the word 酉person瀞 to
mean.  It would deprive personhood of any psychological or normative interest.
More importantly, it would make animalism a mere linguistic variant of the view that
we are brains.  Given that our brains are the true thinkers of our thoughts, the
difference between saying that we normal human people are those thinking brains
and saying that we are the organisms of which they are parts is merely verbal.  It is
a disagreement about which beings our personal pronouns and proper names
denote and fall within the extension of the word 酉person瀞, rather than about the
nature of those beings themselves.  No animalist would accept this.  (I will return
the view that we are brains in the final section.)
I turn now to the proposal that there is no remnant person in the story.  This
would be so if a naked brain could not think (or coincide with a thinking being)--but
I have conceded for the sake of argument that this is possible.  The alternative is to
deny that there really are any such things as naked brains.  (Whether there would
be such things as embodied or undetached brains is left open.)  There are particles
惇arranged cerebrally敦, but they don瀞t compose anything.  (Some things, the xs,
compose something y if and only if each of the xs is a part of y, no two of the xs
share a part, and every part of y shares a part with one or more of the xs.)  So there
speaking.  Despite now being mentally indistinguishable from you, that stage is not
a person--but it would be were it not preceded or followed by stages
psychologically connected with it.  (This follows from the definition of 酉person瀞 given
in Lewis 1976.)  The reason why a person-stage is not a person is simply that it has
the wrong neighbors.
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is no naked brain in the transplant story.  The only material things in the vat are
particles.  But no particle can think.  Maybe certain particles could think collectively,
even if no individual particle can; but in that case too there is no thinker in the vat,
and thus no remnant person.  (Or none that is a material thing.  I won瀞t discuss the
view that remnant people might be immaterial things.)  Call this view brain
eliminativism.12
It may be hard to believe that particles arranged cerebrally in a vat would not
compose anything.  And if they don瀞t, we have to wonder whether particles
惇arranged organically敦 compose anything.  Yet animalists have to accept that
particles arranged organically compose something, namely organisms.  If we are
organisms, then there must be organisms; and whatever Aristotle may have
thought, we know that organisms are composed of particles.  But why should the
inventory of being include human animals but not naked human brains?  What瀞s
the difference?
As far as I can see, the only way to answer this question is to say in what
circumstances particles ever compose something.  How, in general, do smaller
things have to be arranged and situated for them to add up to something bigger?
There are two 惇extreme敦 answers.  Compositional universalism says that any
things, no matter what their nature or arrangement, compose something:
composition is 惇automatic敦.  Compositional nihilism says that there are no
composite objects, but only mereological simples (things with no parts other than
themselves).  Animalism is incompatible with nihilism because no organism is a
simple; and for reasons I have discussed elsewhere (2007: 229-232), it sits
uneasily with universalism.  Animalists need to say that some particles compose
something and others don瀞t.  But which ones, and why?  Very few answers to this
question have been proposed.  Of those few, the best may be van Inwagen瀞s:  that
particles compose something if and only if their activities constitute a biological life
(1990: 81-97).  This implies that the only composite objects are living organisms.
That is of course compatible with animalism.  And it would explain why there are no
remnant people:  a remnant person would be neither an organism nor a simple.
Drastic though it may be, brain eliminativism is not obviously any worse than the
other solutions to the remnant-person problem.
These proposals are a bit wild, and I wish I had a better one.  But this is a
reason to reject animalism only if our being animals is the source of the problem.  I
don瀞t think it is.
Consider Johnston瀞s own view.13  He says that each of us is a nonorganism
13Johnston 1987, 2007: 55-58.  I瀞m not certain that I have correctly understood
Johnston, but this is my best guess.
12Its advocates include van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks (2001); I discuss some of
its consequences in Olson 2015.
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constituted by an organism, where for one thing to constitute another they must at
least be numerically distinct yet made up of the same matter.14  In the transplant
story you are constituted first by an organism, then by a naked brain, then by
another organism--the one that previously constituted me, and which your brain
becomes a part of.  You go with your transplanted brain, avoiding the transplant
objection; and the remnant person is you, avoiding the remnant-person problem.
惇Constitution敦 views of this sort are the most popular alternative to animalism.
But they face their own variant of the remnant-person problem.  If the organism
sitting there now constitutes a person, then your brain--the undetached brain now
in your head--does not.  Otherwise the person it constituted would be a second
person in addition to you.  More generally, every full-sized human person would
contain a brain-sized person within her skull, and you ought to wonder whether you
were the big person or the little one.  To avoid this trouble, constitutionalists say that
normal human animals constitute people--conscious, thinking beings--and
undetached brains do not.  But your brain would constitute a person were it
removed from your head and kept alive in a vat.  It follows that you can cause a
brain to constitute a person merely by cutting away sustaining tissues, and render it
unable to do so by providing it with such tissues.  That looks about as mysterious as
the view that you can create a person by cutting away sustaining tissues and
destroy one by supplying them.  It also raises hard questions:  Why would merely
cutting away the sustaining tissues cause a brain to constitute a thinking being?
Why would restoring them prevent it from doing so?  And why doesn瀞t your brain
constitute a person now, in its normal state?  Constitution views give no clue as to
how these questions might be answered; yet they require answers.  If this isn瀞t the
remnant-person problem all over again, it瀞s a close cousin of it.
Maybe Johnston could explain why your brain would constitute a person in the
vat but not in your head (not that he or anyone else has actually done so).  In that
case animalists ought to be able to explain in the same way why your brain would
be a person in the vat but not in your head.  That would be a version of remnant
cerebralism (§8).  It would give animalists a solution to the remnant-person problem
about as good as Johnston瀞s (that is, about as good as Johnston瀞s would be if he
had an account of why detached but not undetached brains constitute people).  I
say 惇about as good敦 because the animalist proposal would imply that there are four
people in the transplant story when there appear to be only two; but it would
explain why this was so.
In fact constitutionalists face a far more difficult explanatory task than animalists
14Johnston calls the nonorganism a 惇human being敦  and an animal, and calls the
organism a 惇body敦.  This is confusing:  to most ears, a human being, and certainly
an animal, is by definition a kind of organism.   It also gives his view a misleading
appearance of familiarity.  (Parfit is more honest:  he puts his rejection of animalism
by saying that we are not human beings.)  I will describe Johnston瀞s view in my own
terms.
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do.  Animalists have to explain why your undetached brain is not now a person.
Constitutionalists have to do that too, since it瀞s part of their own view.  As we have
seen, they must also account for the additional fact that your brain does not now
constitute a person.  (Animalists, if they are wise, will reject constitution root and
branch, and thus need no special explanation for this fact.)  Further,
constitutionalists need to explain why your brain is not a person when it瀞s in the vat
(they say that it merely constitutes one).  And of course they need to explain why a
normal human organism is not a person or thinking being (but merely constitutes
one) and why a normal human person is not an organism (but is merely constituted
by one).  You and the organism (and you and your brain when you are in the vat)
are physically indistinguishable, with the same surroundings, the same history, and
the same behavior in both actual and counterfactual situations.  Constitutionalists
need to explain how such beings can nevertheless differ radically in their mental
and biological properties.15  Compared to these challenges, what to say about
remnant people--about a wild science-fiction story based on unargued
assumptions about the mental powers of detached organs--looks like a detail.
However troubling the remnant-person problem may be, then, it is not obviously
any worse for animalism than for its main rival.  One view that really would solve the
problem is that we are brains.  That is, each of us--each normal person--is literally a
three-pound lump of soft, yellowish-pink tissue.  I don瀞t mean the view that we are
constituted by brains--that would raise the same explanatory challenges yet again--
but that each of us really is a brain.  Call this the brain view.  It implies that your
brain is a person even now, and removing it from your head would neither make it
into a person nor enable it to constitute one.  The operation would do nothing more
mysterious than change your surroundings.  Some have taken the remnant-person
problem to support something like the brain view.16
The brain view faces many objections (Olson 2007: 84-98).  The most relevant
for present purposes is that, like animalism, it conflicts with common beliefs about
our persistence through time.  My brain might be fixed in formaldehyde after my
death.  (This is a real case, and not science fiction.)  It looks as if that organ would
still exist in this state.  If so, and I am my brain, then I too should still exist.  It would
not be merely a loose manner of speaking, but the literal truth, to say that the brain
in the jar is Olson, the author of this chapter.  If you don瀞t like animalism瀞s
implication that you would stay behind with an empty head in a brain transplant,
you won瀞t like the implication that you could become a specimen in formaldehyde
either.  That may be why no almost no one accepts the brain view.
I am not aware of any better solution to the remnant-person problem than those I
16Campbell and McMahan 2010, Parfit 2012.  I say 惇something like敦 the brain view
because they seem to believe that we are not actually brains, but things constituted
by brains.  This, like Johnston瀞s view, creates more problems than it solves.
15Shoemaker offers such an explanation (1999, 2011; see also Olson 2007: 60-
65).  Johnston does not (2007: 55f.).
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